The stablecoin yield ban: what the GENIUS Act prohibition on interest means for float and treasury policy
The GENIUS Act bars issuers from paying yield to stablecoin holders. What the stablecoin yield ban covers, and how it changes float sizing and sweeps.
- A payment stablecoin does not pay its holder, and that is now a legal rule rather than a market outcome. The GENIUS Act of 2025 bars a permitted payment stablecoin issuer from paying interest or yield to a holder for simply holding the coin.
- The prohibition clearly binds the issuer. Whether it reaches distributors, exchanges and affiliates that pay a reward from elsewhere is still being argued, so plan on the wider reading and do not build a revenue line on the narrow one.
- On your own books a settlement balance behaves like cash in a non-interest-bearing account. The cost is quiet and continuous, it never arrives as a fee, and it is easy to leave unmanaged for a year.
- Float sizing becomes the main lever. Size the balance to the settlement window rather than the month, sweep anything above a written ceiling on a schedule, and charge the business line an internal transfer price for the funding it ties up.
- The European rules agree on the point. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, issuers of e-money tokens and asset-referenced tokens may not grant interest, so one treasury policy can serve both markets.
A payment stablecoin does not pay its holder. That is not a market outcome, it is the law. The GENIUS Act, signed in the United States in July 2025, bars a permitted payment stablecoin issuer from paying interest or yield to a holder for simply holding the coin. The stablecoin yield ban is short in the statute and large in effect, because it decides what a settlement balance is worth to a treasury team.
This article is written for treasury, finance and compliance leaders at credit unions, tier-2 and tier-3 banks and licensed money service businesses. It sets out what the prohibition covers, who it binds, how it changes float sizing and sweep policy, and what a treasury policy should say before a risk committee asks for one. The reading is vendor neutral. The rules cited are the statute and its European counterpart, not a forecast.
What does the stablecoin yield ban actually prohibit?
The prohibition is narrow on its face. Under the GENIUS Act of 2025, a permitted payment stablecoin issuer may not pay interest or yield to a holder solely in connection with holding the stablecoin. It sits beside the reserve rules in the same Act, which require backing of at least one to one in permitted assets such as cash, insured deposits and short dated Treasury instruments, with monthly disclosure of what the reserve holds.
Read the words closely. The bar is on payment for holding. It does not stop an issuer charging a fee, or waiving one. It does not stop your own firm earning a return on its own dollars before they are converted. And it does not reach a tokenised bank deposit, which is a deposit and can pay interest in the ordinary way. The line between a payment stablecoin and a tokenised deposit is now an economic line as well as a legal one, and treasury teams should stop using the two words loosely.
Timing matters for planning. The Act's provisions take effect on the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after final implementing regulations. Work backwards from the earlier date. A policy written now will not need rewriting if the rules arrive late.
Who does the prohibition bind, and who sits outside it?
It binds the issuer. That part is clear. The harder question is whether it reaches the firms standing around the issuer: exchanges, distributors, affiliates and wallet providers that might pay a reward funded from somewhere else. That reading was contested while the bill moved through Congress, and banking trade groups pressed for the wider one. Rulemaking and supervision will settle it.
For a bank or a licensed money service business the practical answer is to plan on the wider reading. Do not build a revenue line, a client incentive or a deposit substitute on the narrow one. A reward paid by a third party on a stablecoin balance also raises its own questions. Who owes the money. What happens to the promise in a stress. Whether the arrangement looks like a deposit or a security to another regulator. None of those questions is answered by the stablecoin yield ban itself, and none of them belongs in a product launch after the fact.
Why does a stablecoin balance behave like a non-earning asset?
Because the return accrues to the issuer, not to you. The issuer holds the reserve and earns whatever the reserve earns. You hold a claim designed to be worth one dollar and nothing more. On your own balance sheet that position behaves like cash in a non-interest-bearing account: liquid, usable for settlement, and earning nothing while it sits.
This is a real cost and it should be stated as one. A balance held for settlement is funding that is not earning net interest margin. If a firm keeps more stablecoin than it needs, the cost is quiet and continuous. It never arrives as a fee, so nobody disputes it in a monthly review, and it is easy to leave unmanaged for a year.
The compensating return is operational rather than financial. Settlement in minutes, on any day of the week, means less has to sit anywhere at all. Pre-funded correspondent accounts, nostro balances and weekend buffers exist because the older rail is slow and closed at times. Speed is what the balance buys. Per the Financial Stability Board's 2021 G20 roadmap targets, 75 percent of cross-border wholesale payments should be credited within one hour of initiation by the end of 2027, and a rail that already clears in minutes lets a treasury team hold less rather than earn more.
How does the yield ban change float sizing and sweep policy?
It makes float sizing the main lever. If the balance cannot earn, the only question worth asking is how small it can safely be. That is an operational calculation rather than a market view. It rests on expected outbound value per settlement window, the largest single payment the corridor must absorb, the time taken to convert fiat into stablecoin and back, and the buffer a corridor needs when a payout partner runs slow.
Three habits follow from that. Size the working balance to the settlement window rather than to the month. Sweep anything above the buffer back into earning assets on a schedule, not on somebody's judgement at the end of a busy day. And price the holding internally, so the business line asking for a faster corridor sees the funding cost of the balance it needs. A transfer price makes the trade off visible and stops the balance drifting upward quarter after quarter.
What should a treasury policy say about stablecoin balances?
A risk committee will want a written policy before it approves a corridor, and an auditor will read it afterwards. The items below are the ones that come up in digital asset reviews. Each can be answered in a line or two, and a policy that answers all of them is short.
- A stated purpose: the balance exists to settle payments, and it is not an investment position, a trading book or a yield product.
- A target working balance and a hard ceiling for each chain and each coin, with the method used to set them written down rather than assumed.
- A sweep rule that says what happens to anything above the ceiling, how often the sweep runs, and who is accountable when it does not run.
- An internal transfer price for the funding tied up in the balance, so the cost sits with the business line that needs the corridor.
- An explicit bar on lending, staking or otherwise chasing a return on the settlement balance, with any exception requiring named senior approval.
- Issuer and counterparty limits: which stablecoins are permitted, the redemption terms being relied on, and the action to take if an issuer gates redemptions.
- A client communications rule: the balance is never described to a client as a deposit, and no yield is quoted, implied or forecast.
- Reporting: daily balance by chain, days of settlement cover, sweep exceptions, and the funding cost for the period.
One point deserves emphasis because it is where firms get into trouble. The temptation, once a balance is sitting there earning nothing, is to put it to work. Lending it, staking it or placing it with a yield platform converts a settlement asset into a credit exposure, and it does so quietly. The policy should close that door in advance, not after a treasurer has found an attractive rate.
A payment stablecoin is a settlement instrument, not a deposit. You are paid in speed and certainty, never in yield, so the discipline is to hold only what the corridor needs.
How does the GENIUS Act ban compare with the European rules?
The two regimes agree on this point. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, the European Union's markets in crypto-assets regulation, issuers of e-money tokens and asset-referenced tokens may not grant interest to holders, and crypto-asset service providers may not do so either. The reasoning on both sides of the Atlantic is the same. A payment token that pays a return starts to compete with a bank deposit without the protections a deposit carries, and it gathers balances that run first in a stress.
For a firm operating in both markets the practical effect is convenient. One treasury policy can be written for both, because the answer to the question is the same in each. The real differences live elsewhere: in authorisation, in what the reserve may hold, and in what must be reported to whom. Those are worth a separate review, and they do not change float sizing.
Where StableNet fits
StableNet, built by SpendTheBits, is a cross-border B2B payment and settlement platform for banks, credit unions, licensed money service businesses, exchange houses and remittance fintechs. Settlement is in regulated stablecoins such as USDC on public blockchains and completes in minutes with on-chain auditability, which is the operational return a non-earning balance has to justify. Every payment is ISO 20022 native, with a pacs.008 customer credit transfer, a pacs.009 interbank leg, pacs.002 status reports, pacs.004 returns and a head.001 envelope, tracked end to end by one UETR. KYB and KYC onboarding, KYT, sanctions and PEP screening and Travel Rule data under IVMS101 run in the same path and write to a tamper-evident audit trail, so the evidence a risk committee asks for is produced by the settlement flow rather than assembled afterwards.
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